The South African Defence Forces in the Border War 1966-1989 by Leopold Scholtz

Author:Leopold Scholtz [Scholtz, Leopold]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Africa, General, Central, Modern, 20th Century
ISBN: 9781909982765
Google: aUicoAEACAAJ
Publisher: Helion
Published: 2014-08-19T01:42:42+00:00

Lull in the fighting

After deciding to continue the counteroffensive east of the Cuito River, the South Africans hunkered down to plan. Deon Ferreira’s force was much better equipped for the counteroffensive than it had been in September, as considerable reinforcements had arrived. (Though, as events would prove, these were still not enough.) On 30 October, 4 SAI arrived south of Mavinga, ready for battle. This unit, a mechanised battalion group similar to 61 Mech, consisted of two mechanised infantry companies (Ratel 20s), an armoured car squadron (Ratel 90s) and a support company (Ratel 90s, Ratel 60s with Milan antitank missiles and Ratel 81s). In addition, the unit had a 120-mm mortar battery, an anti-aircraft troop (Ystervark), a storm pioneer platoon (Ratel 20s) and a combat engineer troop (Ratel 60s). For this operation, a squadron of Olifant Mk 1A tanks (12 vehicles, plus one in reserve), as well as a motorised infantry company from 32 Battalion, was added.

For the first time since 6 SA Division operated in Italy in 1945, South African tanks were about to go into action, under the command of Major (later Colonel) André Retief, who would prove himself an inspiring field commander. The battalion group, probably the strongest and most potent unit in the history of the SADF (1 036 men at the beginning of the operation), was commanded by Commandant Leon Marais, a veteran of operations Protea and Daisy.18 The artillery was also augmented with another G-5 battery and a troop of three pre-production self-propelled G-6 guns (actually four, but the engine of one broke down and could not be repaired before the guns were withdrawn a few weeks later), together with an additional Valkiri MRL troop.19

Captain Danie Crowther, intelligence officer attached to Battle Group Bravo at the time, remembered the excitement in the air when he and his comrades first saw E Squadron’s tanks: “We couldn’t believe our eyes. I mean, we were fighting all these days, various fights against tanks, we shot out many of those … and we never had tanks of our own. Doctrine-wise you fight tanks with tanks, and we didn’t do it. This was big-time now.”20

One is reminded of Ep van Lill’s recommendation during Operation Askari that tanks should be deployed to the operational area, as the Ratel 90 was not adequate to counter the Angolan T-54/55. Why were the Olifant tanks brought to the front only now, and why only one squadron? According to one source, when PW Botha visited the front on 29 September 1987, he inquired impatiently why the army did not use its Olifant tanks, since they had been upgraded at great cost. The generals apparently answered that the army never expected to get permission to use them, given the restrictions under which they had to operate. Nevertheless, this gave the green light for a tank squadron to be brought forward.21

As far as the second question is concerned, the army poured most of its resources for armour into armoured cars, initially Eland 90s and later Ratel 90s.

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